January 21, 2003
RETURN OF THE PRODIGAL ROYALS FANS
Very quietly, Rob Neyer and Rany Jazayerli have resumed their "Rob & Rany on the Royals" feature. Welcome back, guys!
Posted by Dr. Manhattan at 4:57 PM | Permalink
January 20, 2003
A MATTER OF TIMING
Yossi Klein HaLevi explains the case against Amram Mitzna:
In the last two years, a new post-ideological majority has emerged that is ready to consider almost any measure to ensure security and also ready, in principle, to make almost any territorial concession for genuine peace. That majority of hard-line pragmatists lives between the insights of the first and second intifadas - that we cannot occupy the Palestinians and we cannot make peace with them.
Most Israelis today would agree that both greater Israel and Oslo were utopian delusions, wishful ideology imposed on reluctant reality. And they sense that the decades-long debate between Left and Right was in fact an argument between two partial truths: The Left understood the danger of occupation, while the Right understood the danger of appeasement.
Mitzna, though, has learned only the truth of the Left. He remains stuck in the first intifada, and hasn't absorbed the lessons of the second. Like all ideologues, he is capable of holding only one insight at a time.
Ironically, Sharon has revealed greater conceptual expansiveness. By conceding the inevitability of a Palestinian state, he has forfeited the dream of restoring the biblical heartland that animated his political career. The centrist majority won't forgive Labor for Oslo until party leaders offer a similarly clear admission: that the gamble of empowering one group of terrorists to control another group of terrorists was a disastrous miscalculation.
However improbably, Sharon managed to refashion himself from the symbol of our divisiveness into the embodiment of the centrist consensus. Sharon exchanged the wholeness of the land for the wholeness of the nation, becoming our most passionate advocate of national unity.
There's more, all of which should be read.
Posted by Dr. Manhattan at 11:26 PM | Permalink
MR. BUSH'S WAR
Joanthan Rauch compares the war against terorrism to the Cold War, and knocks down certain historical myths about the latter:
Communism and the Soviets were, of course, very different from jihadism or Saddam or Kim. Yet the casting of the Cold War as a chess game between two titans is all hindsight. "Right now, we look back at Communism as centralized and so easy to contain," said Leebaert in an interview, "but that's not how it looked at the time." Communism could mean Moscow or Beijing, Cuba or Vietnam, North Korea or Nicaragua. It could mean armored divisions or shoeless guerrillas or palace coups. It had a hundred guises and a hundred redoubts. And the United States intended to fight them all, everywhere? Surely this was madness.
Today's Americans congratulate themselves on the patient determination that finally brought down the Soviet Union; but, again, that was not how it looked at the time. "So much of the Cold War activity was just winging it, just stumbling along, not getting serious," Leebaert says. U.S. policy fluctuated between poles of confrontation and accommodation. Consistency? You must be joking. Critics said, often rightly, that America was applying double standards left and right.
And for what? Cozying up to murderous African or Latin dictators was no way to win converts to American values; it would mainly create new Communists. Militarily, the Cold War wasn't winnable, as even hawks conceded. If the battle was ever to be won, the decisive front would be economic, and there America's military spending was more hindrance than help. The Cold War was thus the problem, not the solution.
All plausible -- and yet. We know how the story ended.
...Like Truman, Bush has set the country on a potentially long course of wearying and far-flung conflict, not because he wants to, but because "the alternative is much more serious." Is he biting off more than the country can chew? Probably, but so did Truman.
Posted by Dr. Manhattan at 11:21 PM | Permalink
|
Comments (1)