WHY THE IVORY TOWER IS A STATE OF MIND: Dennis Ross proposes another U.S.-led diplomatic initiative to restart a "peace process" between Israel and the Palestinians. Since he served both the Bush (I) and Clinton admnistrations as their point man on Israeli-Palestinian relations and was one of the primary architects of the Oslo-based "peace process" of such enduring accomplishment, it is worth examining his arguments. Despite the fact that he spent as much time in the region and immersed himself in the details of the negotiations as anyone else, his ideas still seem fatally divorced from reality.
Ross' main point is that the U.S. should start a four-point initiative, as follows:
First, we would ask Israel to halt its attacks and lift the siege of the Palestinians for 10 days. Should Israel get intelligence about a planned terrorist act in this period, it would inform Palestinian security forces and the United States. If the Palestinians did not act immediately to preempt the attack, the Israelis would have the right to do so.
OK... for every terrorist attack that succeeds, the Israelis prevent several others. Is it realistic to give first crack at prevention to those who have been (at best) encouraging the attackers? It is a recipe for a greater success ratio for the terrorists. This policy may not last past 9 A.M. on the first day of this plan.
Second, the Palestinian Authority would act decisively and unequivocally in the 10-day period to try to prevent all acts of terror and violence against Israelis. It would also begin to fulfill Yasser Arafat's previous promises to Zinni to make real, not fake, arrests and to dismantle terror organizations.
This has been on the agenda since the day the Oslo accords were signed in 1993, and hasn't happened yet. So when it fails to happen again...
Third, the United States would reconstitute the Committee on Verification and Monitoring mandated by the Wye River Agreement of 1998. Zinni would chair the committee and have it meet every day for the 10-day period; he would discuss the commitments each side has made, the gap between performance and commitment and the steps needed to bridge that gap. And he would be ready to announce who is fulfilling and not fulfilling his obligations. Based on the work of this committee, we should make sure our allies are prepared to join us in a common denunciation of the side not fulfilling its commitments.
At this point, you will run into the same issues that have prevented this from happening since 1993. Let's say the Palestinians fail to comply with certain requirements of the agreements - like #2 above, or having "security forces" many times larger than the one allowed under Oslo, or many times more (and heavier) weapons than allowed. Our allies who should be "prepared to join us in a common denunciation of the side not fulfilling its commitments" will bring tremendous pressure on us to spare Arafat in our denunciations - using all the familar arguments, and some new ones (like how any such criticism will jeopardize any supposed support we are getting for attacking Iraq). Under the Oslo-based process which Mr. Ross helped design, those exigencies always carried the day and the denunciations never occurred. Thus one side, which had forsworn violence, was emboldened to (a) build up an army with which to challenge its negotiating partner and (b) believe they could violate any agreement without consequence. If you want a recipe for the result of such "peace process" being a war like the one that exists now, that's a good place to start.
Basically, Ross is saying that the U.S. should now do what it avoided doing for almost a decade. It sounds good, but (a) it would be nice if he admitted as much, as he bears responsibility for why these steps were never taken before now and (b) it doesn't take into account why these steps have never been taken.
Fourth, assuming the initial 10-day period brings a halt to the violence, the Israelis, Palestinians, Egyptians, Jordanians and Saudis would send representatives to Washington at the foreign minister level to work out a timeline of steps to be taken over a six-month period. This high-level meeting would break new ground for the Bush administration. Its purpose would be to cement and institutionalize the initial period of stability; to introduce the additional measures called for in the Tenet and Mitchell plans for changing the climate so negotiations could be resumed; to fix a point at which talks would resume; and to establish the agenda for the negotiations.
Even if the violence does actually pause for those 10 days (and that's one hell of an assumption), a main lesson of the last 18 months is that the fundamental compromises that must take place in order for any peace to take hold (i.e., the Palestinians understanding that they will not be able to return to their ancestral homes) are not items that can be decided at a "high-level" negotiation; the people itself must accept them before peace can hold. The Israelis have certainly not been perfect at understanding compromises that they must make, but the concept of dismantling (at least many) settlements has been long and openly discussed and is agreed to by a large percentage of the population. By contrast, the Palestinian leadership has encouraged the fantasies of its population that they will be able to return to their old homes in Israel, an idea which is a total non-starter. As long as such beliefs are widely held, there is no reason to think that a peace based on a negotiation which compromises them will hold (regardless of how many "high-level" negotiations are held.) The stress on "high-level" negotiations shows that Ross still does not understand that.
Somehow, I don't think Robert McNamara had much credibility after Vietnam. The analogy is not perfect, but Ross was a primary architect of the most prestigious U.S. diplomatic effort of the last decade, one which has degenerated into total disaster. That should be kept in mind when considering his further prescriptions for the matter.